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Consumer Spending and the  
Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008†
By Jonathan A. Parker, Nicholas S. Souleles,  
David S. Johnson, and Robert McClelland*
In the winter of 2007–2008, facing an increasingly severe financial crisis and 
already contemplating the limitations of traditional monetary policy, Congress and 
the Administration turned to fiscal policy to help stabilize the US economy. The 
Economic Stimulus Act (ESA) of 2008, enacted in February 2008, consisted pri-
marily of a 100 billion dollar program that sent tax rebates, called economic stimu-
lus payments (ESPs), to approximately 130 million US tax filers. The desirability 
of this historically important use of fiscal policy depends critically on the extent to 
which these tax cuts directly changed household spending, as well as on any subse-
quent multiplier or price effects.
This paper measures the change in household spending directly caused by the 
receipt of the ESPs by using a natural experiment provided by the structure of the 
tax cut. The ESPs varied across households in amount, method of disbursement, 
and timing. Typically, single individuals received $300–$600 and couples received 
$600–$1,200; in addition, households received $300 per child who qualified for the 
child tax credit. Households received these payments through either paper checks 
sent by mail or electronic funds transfers (EFTs) into their bank accounts. Most 
importantly, within each disbursement method, the timing of receipt was determined 
by the final two digits of the recipient’s Social Security number (SSN), digits that 
are effectively randomly assigned.1 We exploit this random variation to estimate the 
causal effect of the receipt of the payments on household spending, by comparing 
the spending of households that received payments in a given period to the spend-
ing of households that received payments in other periods. We closely follow the 
1 The last four digits of an SSN are assigned sequentially to applicants within geographic areas (which determine 
the first three digits of the SSN) and a “group” (the middle two digits of the SSN).
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 methodology of Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006)—henceforth, JPS—which 
analyzes the 2001 tax rebates, since one of our main objectives is to compare the 
responses to the two stimulus programs.
To conduct our analysis, we worked with the staff at the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) to add supplemental questions about the payments to the ongoing Consumer 
Expenditure (CE) Survey, which contains comprehensive measures of household-
level expenditures. These supplemental questions ask CE households to report the 
amount and month of receipt of each stimulus payment they received. The 2008 tax 
cut was the first large tax cut to use EFTs, and EFTs are likely to be used increas-
ingly frequently in the future. Accordingly, our CE module also asked a new ques-
tion (not asked in 2001) about the method of disbursement of each payment (mailed 
paper check versus EFT), as well as some other questions we analyze elsewhere.
We find that on average households spent about 12 to 30 percent of their stimulus 
payments, depending on the specification, on nondurable consumption goods and 
services (as defined in the CE survey) during the three-month period in which the 
payments were received. This response is statistically and economically significant. 
We also find a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods and related ser-
vices, primarily the purchase of vehicles, bringing the average response of total CE 
consumption expenditures to about 50 to 90 percent of the payments during the 
three-month period of receipt.
These findings are statistically and economically broadly consistent across speci-
fications that use different forms of variation, although the point estimates tend to be 
the largest in specifications that identify the spending effects only from variation in 
timing among households that receive ESPs at some point.2 The estimated effects are 
similar for ESPs received by EFT compared to those received by mail. We also find 
some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response in the subsequent three-month 
period following that of ESP receipt. While this response cannot be estimated with 
precision, it does provide evidence that the spending effects are not rapidly reversed.
Although our findings do not depend on any particular theoretical model, the 
estimated response rejects the rational expectations life-cycle/permanent income 
hypothesis (LCPIH), which implies no spending response to a predictable change in 
income. Further, even if some households were surprised by the arrival of the ESP, 
our estimated responses are large enough to reject both the LCPIH, which implies 
that households should consume at most the annuitized value of a transitory increase 
in income like the ESPs, and Ricardian equivalence, which implies no spending 
response at all.
For comparison, JPS estimates that in 2001, upon receipt of a tax rebate, house-
hold spending on nondurable goods rose on average by 20 to 40 percent of the tax 
rebate (depending on the specification), a response which is just slightly larger than 
the response estimated here across similar specifications.3 However, we find larger 
2 Unlike the current study, JPS had insufficient power to identify a significant spending response using only the 
variation in timing of rebate receipt.
3 In subsequent work, Misra and Surico (2011) also find estimates in this range when applying quantile regres-
sions to the JPS data. We find that trimming the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of change in dollar 
consumption reduces the JPS baseline average response of nondurable goods (Douglas Hamilton pointed out a 
similar result to us), but the result again stays within the reported cross-specification range. Other trimmed versions 
of the JPS results are largely unchanged (e.g., the response of low income or asset households) or increase (e.g., 
the effect on total spending).
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total spending in 2008 due to significant spending on durable goods. While some of 
this difference may be due to sampling error, it may also partly reflect some of the 
differences in the details of the tax cut and economic environment in 2008 compared 
to 2001. For instance, some prior research finds that larger payments can skew the 
composition of spending towards durables, which is consistent with our findings 
given that the 2008 stimulus payments were on average about twice the size of the 
2001 rebates.4 That said, the overall pattern of results is broadly similar for 2001 
and 2008, and so our findings suggest some robustness in the response of consum-
ers to the broad-based tax rebates employed in these two most recent and important 
recessions.
To be clear, our methodology is unable to estimate the complete effect of the ESP 
program on aggregate consumption. This is because we estimate only the spending 
caused by the receipt of an ESP and correlated with the timing of receipt (in par-
ticular not including any spending at the time of announcement). Also, our method-
ology cannot estimate the general equilibrium effects of the policy (any multiplier 
or price effects). Keeping these issues in mind, our point estimates together with 
the schedule of ESP disbursements imply that the receipt of the ESPs caused a 
 partial-equilibrium increase in demand for nondurable goods of $33 to $80 billion 
(at an annual rate) in the second quarter of 2008, and $15 to $36 billion (at an annual 
rate) in the third quarter. Our estimates for total CE spending imply an increase in 
demand of about 1.3 to 2.3 percent of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) in 
the second quarter, and 0.6 to 1.0 percent of PCE in the third quarter (again at annual 
rates).5 While these are substantial partial equilibrium effects, the ultimate impact 
of the ESPs on aggregate consumption may be higher or lower than implied by 
these calculations, due to possible changes in prices or interest rates, or to additional 
spending through multiplier or anticipatory effects.
To help improve our understanding of consumption behavior, we also analyze the 
heterogeneity in the spending response across households with different characteris-
tics and across different categories of consumption expenditures. Across households, 
the estimated spending responses are largest for older and low-income households, 
groups which have substantial and statistically significant spending responses. The 
point estimates are largest for high-asset households, but none of the results using 
assets—which are not as well measured in the CE—are significant. Finally, moti-
vated by the collapse of the housing market in 2008, we find that homeowners on 
4 While JPS finds no significant response of durable goods in 2001, Souleles (1999) finds a significant increase 
in both nondurable and durable goods (in particular auto purchases) in response to springtime federal income tax 
refunds, which are substantially larger than the 2001 tax rebates. Federal tax refunds currently average around 
$2,500 per recipient, whereas the average rebate in 2001 came to about $480 (JPS). (Aaronson, Agarwal, and 
French 2012; Leininger, Levy, and Schanzenbach (2010); and Wilcox (1989) also find a significant response in 
durable goods to changes in income. See also Barrow and McGranahan (2000) and Adams, Einav, and Levin (2009) 
for related results for the earned income tax credit and for subprime auto sales, respectively.) Finally, temporary 
subsidies to purchase prices induce intertemporal substitution and so can cause large increases in durables pur-
chases but also later declines (Mian and Sufi 2012). By contrast, tax rebates are likely to operate through wealth and 
liquidity effects, which theoretically do not imply such large reversals, as we discuss in section VII.
5 These figures are based on estimates in Tables 2 and 3 and so omit statistically insignificant lagged spending. 
The calculations assume that the contemporaneous estimates represent spending done in the month of receipt and 
the month after. Using estimates from Table 5 that include lagged spending effects, the corresponding estimates are, 
for nondurable expenditures, $66 billion in the second quarter and $75 billion in the third, and for total spending, 
$198 billion in the second quarter and $227 billion in the third, or 1.9 and 2.2 percent of PCE, respectively.
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average spent more of their ESPs than did renters, a difference that is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.
Of the many papers that test the consumption-smoothing implications of the 
LCPIH, the most closely related to our work is the set of papers that uses household-
level data and quasi-experiments to identify the effects on consumption caused by 
predictable changes in income, including in particular income changes induced by 
tax policy. Our current findings are consistent with several recent studies of the 
spending response to tax rebates (Agarwal, Liu, and Souleles 2007; Broda and 
Parker 2008; JPS; and Bertrand and Morse 2009).6
This paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the relevant aspects of ESA 
2008. Section II describes the CE data, and Section III sets forth our empirical meth-
odology. Section IV presents the main results regarding the short-run response to the 
economic stimulus payments, while Section V examines the longer-run response. 
Section VI examines the differences in response across different types of households 
and across different categories of expenditure. A final section concludes.
I. The 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments
ESA 2008 provided ESPs to the majority of US households (roughly 85 percent 
of “tax units”). The ESP consisted of a basic payment and—conditional on eligibil-
ity for the basic payment—a supplemental payment of $300 per child who qualified 
for the child tax credit. To be eligible for the basic payment, a household needed to 
have positive net income tax liability, or at least sufficient “qualifying income.”7 For 
eligible households, the basic payment was generally the maximum of $300 ($600 
for couples filing jointly) and their tax liability up to $600 ($1,200 for couples). 
Households without tax liability received basic payments of $300 ($600 for couples), 
so long as they had at least $3,000 of qualifying income (which includes earned 
income and Social Security benefits, as well as certain Railroad Retirement and 
veterans’ benefits). Moreover, the total stimulus payment phased out with income, 
being reduced by 5 percent of the amount by which adjusted gross income exceeded 
$75,000 ($150,000 for couples). As a result, the stimulus payments were more tar-
geted to lower-income households than were the 2001 tax rebates.
The key to our measurement strategy is that the timing of ESP disbursement 
was effectively randomized across households. Table 1 shows the schedule of ESP 
 disbursement.8 For recipients that had provided the IRS with their personal bank 
6 Deaton (1992), Browning and Lusardi (1996), and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) review the consumption-
smoothing literature in general, and JPS and the working paper version of this article, Parker et al. (2011), review 
the tax rebate literature in particular. A complementary set of papers surveys households about how they used or 
plan to use their rebates (Shapiro and Slemrod (2003a, 2003b); Coronado, Lupton, and Sheiner 2006; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2009; Shapiro and Slemrod 2009; Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod 2010). Parker et al. (2011) analyzes 
the consistency of such self-reported spending with our regression-based causal estimates of the response of spend-
ing. Auerbach and Gale (2010) surveys recent fiscal policy more broadly.
7 To expedite the disbursement of the payments, they were calculated using data from tax year 2007 returns (and 
so only those filing 2007 returns received the payments). If subsequently a household’s tax year 2008 data implied 
a larger payment, the household could claim the difference on its 2008 return filed in 2009. However, if the 2008 
data implied a smaller payment, the household did not have to return the difference.
8 The IRS schedule reports the latest date by which the ESPs are supposed to have been received by households. 
Accordingly, as also discussed below, the payments were disbursed (i.e., put in the mail or electronically transferred 
to banks) slightly earlier.
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routing number (i.e., for direct deposit of a tax refund), the stimulus payments were 
disbursed electronically over a three-week period ranging from late April to mid-
May.9 For households that did not provide a routing number, the payments were 
mailed using paper checks over a nine-week period ranging from early May through 
early July.10 The IRS mailed a notice to the ESP recipients in advance of sending the 
payments.11 Importantly, within each disbursement method, the particular timing of 
the payment was determined by the last two digits of the recipients’ Social Security 
numbers, which are effectively randomly assigned.
In aggregate the stimulus payments in 2008 were historically large, amounting to 
about $100 billion, which in real terms is about double the size of the 2001 rebate 
program. According to the Department of the Treasury (2008), $79 billion in ESPs 
was disbursed in the second quarter of 2008, which corresponds to about 2.2 percent 
of GDP or 3.1 percent of PCE in that quarter. During the third quarter, $15 billion 
in ESPs was disbursed, corresponding to about 0.4 percent of GDP or 0.6 percent of 
PCE. The stimulus payments constituted about two-thirds of the total ESA package, 
which also included various business incentives and foreclosure relief.12 This article 
focuses on the stimulus payments, as recorded in our CE dataset.
9 Payments were directly deposited only to personal bank accounts. Payments were mailed to tax filers who had 
provided the IRS with their tax preparer’s routing number, e.g., as part of taking out a “refund anticipation loan.” 
Such situations are common, representing about a third of the tax refunds delivered via direct deposit in 2007.
10 Due to the electronic deposits, about half of the aggregate stimulus payments were disbursed by the end of 
May. While most of the rest of the payments came in June and July, taxpayers who filed their 2007 return late could 
receive their payment later than the above schedule. Since about 92 percent of taxpayers typically file at or before 
the normal April 15th deadline (Slemrod et al. 1997), this source of variation is small. Nonetheless, we present 
results below that exclude such late payments.
11 For paper checks, the notices were mailed about a week before the checks were mailed. For EFTs, the notices 
were sent a couple of business days before the direct deposits were supposed to be credited. The recipients’ banks 
were also notified a couple of days before the date of the electronic transfers, and some banks might have credited 
some of the electronic payments to the recipients’ accounts a day or more before the official payment date. For 
example, some EFTs that had been scheduled to be deposited on Monday, April 28 were reported to the banks on 
Thursday April 24, and some banks appear to have credited recipients’ accounts on Friday, April 25.
12 For more details on ESA, see, e.g., Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod (2010).
Table 1—The Timing of the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008
Payments by electronic funds transfer Payments by mailed check
Last two digits of  
taxpayer SSN
Date ESP funds  
transferred to account by
Last two digits of 
taxpayer SSN
Date check to be  
received by
00–20 May 2 00–09 May 16
21–75 May 9 10–18 May 23
76–99 May 16 19–25 May 30
26–38 June 6
39–51 June 13
52–63 June 20
64–75 June 27
76–87 July 4
88–99 July 11
Source: Internal Revenue Service (http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180247,00.
html).
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II. The Consumer Expenditure Survey
The CE interview survey contains detailed measures of the expenditures of a strat-
ified random sample of US households. Households are interviewed four times, at 
three-month intervals, about their spending over the previous three months. Because 
new households are added to the survey every month, the data can be used to iden-
tify spending effects from ESPs disbursed in different months.
Questions about the 2008 ESPs were added to the CE survey in interviews con-
ducted between June 2008 and March 2009, which covers the crucial time during 
which the payments were disbursed.13 The questions were phrased to be consistent 
with the style of other CE questions and the 2001 tax rebate questions. Households 
were asked whether they received any “economic stimulus payments…also called a 
tax rebate” since the beginning of the reference period for the interview and, if so, 
the amount of each payment and the date it was received. Unlike 2001, for each pay-
ment households were also asked whether it was received by check or direct deposit. 
The Appendix contains the language of the CE survey instruments.
To maintain consistency, our use of the data follows JPS. We sum all stimulus 
payments received by each household in each three-month reference period to cre-
ate our main economic stimulus payment variable, ESP. We use the 2007 and 2008 
waves of the CE data (which include interviews in the first quarter of 2009) and 
analyze only households with at least one expenditure interview during the period in 
which the ESP questions were in the field. Finally, we focus on a series of increas-
ingly aggregated measures of consumption expenditures: (i) food, which includes 
food consumed away from home, food consumed at home, and purchases of alco-
holic beverages; (ii) strictly nondurable expenditures, which follows Lusardi (1996); 
(iii) nondurable expenditures, which follows previous research using the CE survey 
and includes semi-durable categories like apparel, health, and reading materials; 
(iv) total expenditures, which also includes durable expenditures such as home fur-
nishings, entertainment equipment, and auto purchases.14
The responses to the CE questions match reasonably well the other limited 
information available about the ESPs. The average value of ESP, conditional on a 
positive value, is about $1,000, and about two-thirds of households reported receiv-
ing rebates during the main period of their disbursement. Households that receive 
ESPs by EFT on average have slightly higher expenditures, are slightly younger, 
have higher incomes and liquid assets, and have larger ESPs than households that 
receive the payments by mail. Consistent with the payments specified by ESA, most 
reported ESPs are in multiples of $300, with about 55 percent of reports reflecting 
the (maximum) basic payments of $600 or $1,200. The aggregate amount of ESPs is 
13 Ideally, since some ESPs arrived in April, the survey would have been in the field in May, e.g., for respondents 
whose last interview was in May.
14 Unlike in JPS, we find that the spending effect on total expenditures in 2008 is estimated with relative statisti-
cal precision. This could in part reflect the larger number of payments (about 30 percent more) in the sample in 
2008, and the larger size (over double) of these payments. Suggestive of an improvement in data quality, there is 
also a decline in the ratio of the standard deviation of the change in household-level expenditures to the average 
level of expenditures between 2001 and 2008 for all our major expenditure categories. This may be due to the CE 
survey’s transition in 2003 from using survey booklets to using computer-assisted personal-interview (CAPI) soft-
ware. The CE survey measures expenditures independent of the use of credit or debt, so the measured expenditure 
for durables purchased using financing is the full price of the durable, not just the down payment.
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$94.6 billion in the weighted, raw CE data, which is quite close to the $96.2  billion 
reported in the Daily Treasury Statements (Department of the Treasury 2008). The 
temporal pattern of ESP receipt is also broadly similar across the two sources, though 
the CE data have fewer ESPs reported during the peak month of May and more in 
the following months, suggesting the possibility that some households took time to 
notice their ESP receipt or that there is some other tendency to report a somewhat 
later date of receipt than actually occurred.15
III. Empirical Methodology
Consistent with specifications in the previous literature (e.g., Zeldes 1989; Lusardi 
1996; Parker 1999; Souleles 1999; and JPS), our main estimating equation is
(1)  C i,t+1 −  C i,t =  ∑ 
s
 
 
 β 0s ×  month s,i +  β 1 ′  X i,t +  β 2  ESP i,t+1 +  u i,t+1 ,
where i indexes households, and t indexes time, C is either household consumption 
expenditures or their log; month represents a complete set of indicator variables 
for every period in the sample, used to absorb the seasonal variation in consump-
tion expenditures as well as the average of all other concurrent aggregate factors; 
and X represents control variables (age and changes in family size) included to 
absorb some of the preference-driven differences in the growth rate of consump-
tion expenditures across households. ES P i,t+1 represents our key stimulus payment 
variable, which takes one of three forms: (i) the total dollar amount of payments 
received by household i in period t + 1 (ES P i,t+1 ); (ii) a dummy variable indi-
cating whether any payment was received in t + 1 (I(ES P i,t+1 > 0)); and (iii) a 
distributed lag of ESP or I(ESP > 0), used to measure the longer-run effects of 
the payments. The key coefficient  β 2 measures the average response of household 
expenditure to the arrival of a stimulus payment.16 To analyze heterogeneity in the 
response to the payments, we interact ES P i,t+1 with indicators for different types of 
households. We correct the standard errors to allow for arbitrary heteroskedastic-
ity and within-household serial correlation.
The Euler-equation literature focuses on testing whether predictable changes in 
income are orthogonal to the residual ( u i,t+1 ) over time; that is, whether  β 2 equals 
zero (Chamberlain 1984; Souleles 2004). In contrast, here we use the randomized 
timing of ESP receipt to ensure orthogonality between the residual and our ESP 
regressor in the cross-section, which allows us to estimate  β 2 and, thus, measure the 
causal effect of the payments on expenditure, regardless of whether the LCPIH is 
true or not. Nonetheless, our estimate still provides a direct test of the LCPIH and 
Ricardian equivalence, as discussed in the introduction.17
15 Our working paper Parker et al. (2011) contains more details about the data.
16 Our empirical approach estimates only the spending response correlated with the timing of the payment 
receipt. Our approach cannot estimate the magnitude of any common response as may have occurred in anticipation 
of the payments, both because the passage of ESA cannot be separated from other aggregate effects captured by our 
time dummies, such as seasonality and monetary policy, and because there is no single point in time at which a tax 
cut went from being entirely unexpected to being entirely expected.
17 Even though February 2008, when the ESA was passed, can fall in period t for some sample households 
receiving a payment, under our maintained assumptions, any announcement effect does not bias our estimate of  β 2 . 
Whenever information about the tax cuts underlying the ESPs became publicly available, whether preceding the 
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IV. The Short-Run Response of Expenditure
This section estimates the change in consumption expenditures caused by receipt 
of a stimulus payment during the three-month period of receipt, using the contem-
poraneous payment variables ES P t+1 and I(ES P t+1 > 0) in equation (1). Following 
JPS, we begin by estimating (the average)  β 2 using all available variation in the 
full sample and subsequently refine our identification strategy by dropping nonre-
cipients and late recipients from our sample, and by using only the variation in the 
timing of ESP receipt within each method of disbursement (check versus EFT). The 
subsequent section estimates the lagged response to the payments.
A. Variation across All Households
In Table 2, the first set of four columns displays the results of estimating equation (1) 
by ordinary least squares (OLS), with the dollar change in consumption expenditures 
as the dependent variable and the contemporaneous amount of the payment (ESP) 
as the key independent variable. The resulting estimates of  β 2 measure the average 
fraction of the payment spent on the different expenditure aggregates in each column, 
within the three-month reference period in which the payment was received.
actual passage of ESA or not, under the LCPIH any resulting wealth effects should be small and should have arisen 
at the same time(s) for all consumers, so their average effects on expenditure would be picked up by the correspond-
ing time dummies in equation (1). More important, heterogeneity in such wealth effects (or in  β 2 ) should not be 
correlated with the timing of ESP receipt, so (the average)  β 2 should still be estimated consistently.
Table 2—The Contemporaneous Response of Expenditures to ESP Receipt among All Households
Food
Strictly 
nondurables 
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
 
Food
Strictly 
nondurables 
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
OLS OLS OLS OLS   OLS OLS OLS OLS
Panel A. Dollar change in spending
ESP 0.016 0.079 0.121 0.516 
(0.027) (0.046) (0.055) (0.179)
I(ESP) 10.9 74.8 121.5 494.5
(31.7) (56.6) (67.2) (207.2)
Food
Strictly 
nondurables 
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services Food
Strictly 
nondurables 
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
OLS OLS OLS OLS   2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel B. Percent change in spending Panel C. Dollar change in spending
ESP 0.012 0.079 0.128 0.523
(0.033) (0.060) (0.071) (0.219)
I(ESP) 0.69 1.74 2.09 3.24
(1.27) (0.96) (0.94) (1.17)
Notes: All regressions also include a full set of month dummies, age, change in the number of adults, and change 
in the number of children following equation (1). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-house-
hold correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in panel B are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent 
change. The last four columns report results from 2SLS regressions where the indicator variable for ESP receipt 
and the other regressors are used as instruments for the amount of the ESP. All regressions use 17,478 observations 
except for the first two columns of panel B which have only 17,427 and 17,475, respectively.
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We find that, during the three-month period in which a payment was received, a 
household on average increased its expenditures on food by about 2 percent of the 
payment, its expenditures on strictly nondurable goods by 8 percent of the payment, 
and its expenditures on nondurable goods by 12 percent of the payment. The third 
result is statistically significant. The fourth column shows that expenditures on total 
consumption increased on average by 52 percent of the payment, a substantial and 
statistically significant amount.
These results identify the effect of a payment from variation in both the tim-
ing of payment receipt and the dollar amount of the payment. While the variation 
in the payment amount is possibly uncorrelated with the residual in equation (1), 
the variation is not purely random since the payment amount depends upon house-
hold characteristics such as tax status, income, and number of dependents. Unlike 
most previous research, we can refine the variation that we use to focus on variation 
known to be exogenous.
The remaining columns of Table 2 use only variation in whether any payment 
was received at all in a given period, not the dollar amount of payments received. 
The second set of columns in panel A uses the indicator variable I(ESP > 0) in 
 equation (1). In this case  β 2 measures the average dollar increase in expenditures 
caused by receipt of a payment. During the three-month period in which a pay-
ment was received, households on average increased their nondurable expenditures 
by $122, which is statistically significant at the 7 percent level. Total expenditures 
increased by a significant $495. Compared to an average payment of just under 
$1,000, these results are consistent with the previous estimates in the first set of col-
umns, which also used variation in the magnitude of the payments received.
As a robustness check, panel B uses the change in log expenditures as the depen-
dent variable. On average in the three-month period in which a payment was received, 
nondurable expenditures increased by 2.1 percent, and total expenditures increased 
by 3.2 percent. These are statistically and economically significant effects. At the 
average ESP and level of nondurable and total expenditures, these results imply pro-
pensities to spend of 0.120 and 0.364 respectively, which are consistent with, though 
slightly smaller than, the previous results in the table.
Finally, to estimate a value interpretable as a marginal propensity to spend upon 
payment receipt without using variation in ESP amount, we estimate equation (1) by 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). We instrument for the payment amount, ESP, using 
the indicator variable, I(ESP > 0), along with the other independent variables. As in 
the first set of results in panel A,  β 2 then measures the fraction of the payment that is 
spent within the three-month period of receipt. As shown in panel C, the estimated 
marginal propensities to spend remain close in magnitude to those estimated in the 
first set of results, which did not treat ESP as potentially nonexogenous.18
18 Parker et al. (2011) discusses how these results are generally robust across a number of additional sensitivity 
checks. For example, using median regressions or winsorizing the dependent variable generally leads to very similar 
results for food and strictly nondurable goods. For nondurable goods and total expenditures, the resulting coeffi-
cients are still statistically and economically significant (and substantially larger than those for strictly nondurable 
goods) though generally smaller than in Table 2, which is consistent with iatrogenic bias since by mostly dropping 
large durables purchases, one biases down the estimates of the average spending caused by the ESP.
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B. Variation among Households That Receive ESPs at Some Time
The results in panel C of Table 2 identify the effect of ESP receipt on spending by 
comparing the behavior of households that received payments at different times to 
the behavior of households that did not receive payments during those times. Since 
some households did not receive any payment, in any period, the results still use 
some information that comes from comparing households that received payments to 
households that never received payments. We now investigate the role of this varia-
tion using a number of different approaches, for brevity focusing on nondurable 
expenditures and total expenditures.
First, we add to equation (1) an indicator for households that received a payment 
in any reference quarter, I(ES P i,t+1 > 0 for any t ) i , which allows the expenditure 
growth of payment recipients to differ on average from that of nonrecipients. In this 
case, the main regressor I(ESP > 0) captures only higher-frequency variation in 
the timing of payment receipt—receipt in quarter t+1 in particular—conditional on 
receipt in some quarter. As reported in panel A of Table 3, the estimated coefficients 
for the effect of the payment (ESP and I(ESP > 0)) are quite similar to those in 
Table 2, and the estimated coefficients on I(ES P i,t+1 > 0 for any t ) i are statistically 
insignificant. Hence, apart from the effect of the payment, there is little difference 
between the expenditure growth of payment recipients and nonrecipients over the 
Table 3—The Response to ESP Receipt among Households Receiving Payments
Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Sample of all households (N = 17,478)
ESP 0.117 0.507 0.123 0.509
(0.060) (0.196) (0.081) (0.253)
I(ESP) 2.63 3.97
(1.07) (1.34)
I(ES P i,t > 0 for any t)i 9.58 21.21 −0.88 −1.17 8.23 20.77(36.07) (104.00) (0.50) (0.63) (38.79) (112.18)
Panel B. Sample of households receiving ESPs (N = 11,239)
ESP 0.185 0.683 0.252 0.866
(0.066) (0.219) (0.103) (0.329)
I(ESP) 3.91 5.63
(1.33) (1.69)
Panel C. Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,488)
ESP 0.214 0.590 0.308 0.911
(0.070) (0.217) (0.112) (0.342)
I(ESP) 4.52 6.05
(1.50) (1.89)
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, 
the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary 
 within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are mul-
tiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of columns report results from 2SLS regressions 
where the indicator variable for ESP receipt and the other regressors are used as instruments for the amount of the 
ESP. The variable I(ES P i,t > 0 for any t ) i is an indicator for households that received an ESP in some reference 
quarter, whereas I(ESP > 0) indicates receipt in the contemporaneous quarter (t+1) in particular.
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quarters in the sample period around the payments, and thus such a difference is not 
spuriously generating the results in Table 2.
Our second approach is more stringent. We exclude from the sample all house-
holds that did not report a payment in any of their interviews. The advantage of 
this approach is that, when we do not use variation in ESP amount, the response 
of spending is identified using only the variation in the timing of payment receipt 
conditional on receipt at some time. That is, identification comes from comparing 
the spending of households that received payments in a given period to the spending 
of households that also received payments but in other periods. The disadvantage 
of this approach is that it leads to a reduction in power due to the resulting decline 
in sample size and effective variation. Nonetheless, panel B of Table 3 shows that 
the estimates are broadly consistent with the previous results, although both point 
estimates and standard errors are somewhat larger.
Third, we drop all households that received late stimulus payments, after the main 
period of their (randomized) disbursement. Although the timing of late payments 
is not necessarily endogenous, it is not randomized. The vast majority of house-
holds that received late ESPs did so due to filing late tax returns for tax year 2007, 
although as noted there also seem to be some lags in reporting (or in noticing) the 
payments in the CE survey. We follow JPS and allow one month’s “grace period” in 
excluding late ESPs, so that we consider a mailed payment to be late if it is reported 
received after August, and an electronic payment (or any payment with missing data 
on the method of disbursement) to be late if it is reported received after June.
Table 3 panel C shows that the results remain statistically and economically sig-
nificant. In the final set of columns using 2SLS, on average nondurable expenditures 
increased by 31 percent of the payment in the quarter of receipt, and total expendi-
tures increased by 91 percent of the payment. Given that this approach has sufficient 
power to identify the key parameter of interest, we focus on this sample as our main 
sample for the remainder of the article.
As another robustness check, Figure 1 compares the histograms of the distribution 
of changes in expenditure for observations during which an ESP is received versus 
observations during which an ESP is not received. The figure focuses on the sample 
of on-time recipients and the time period during which the ESPs were being dis-
tributed (i.e., when the t+1 interview occurs between June 2008 and October 2008, 
with the corresponding expenditure reference periods covering the preceding three 
months). As shown, there is a larger share of recipients than nonrecipients in most 
ranges of increases in spending, and a larger share of nonrecipients than recipients in 
most ranges of decreases in spending. (Each cell in panel A represents a $300 range, 
and in panel B a $600 range, so these differences are economically significant). 
While these histograms do not control for any covariates (which affect power, not 
consistency), they support our main findings nonparametrically in the raw data and 
show that outliers are not driving the main findings. The analogous histograms are 
very similar for the sample in Table 2.
In sum, even when limiting the variation to the timing of ESP receipt conditional 
on (nonlate) receipt, the results imply that the receipt of the ESPs had a significant 
effect on household spending. By contrast, in JPS, analogously limiting the sample 
to nonlate rebate recipients leads to a larger reduction in precision and a loss of 
statistical significance.
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C. Method of Disbursement
One novel feature of the 2008 ESP program was the use of electronic funds trans-
fers in addition to mailed checks. About 40 percent of the CE households received 
their payments via EFTs. This section first asks whether the method of disbursement 
affects the estimated spending impact of the ESPs. Second, since the method of 
disbursement is not randomly assigned and affects the time of receipt, one can think 
of the ESP program as providing two natural experiments within distinct samples. 
Accordingly, we will proceed to investigate whether we can identify the causal effect 
of payment receipt from only the difference in arrival times within each method of 
disbursement.
Figure 1. Histograms of Change in Expenditure for ESP Recipients during the Program
Panel B. Change in total expenditure
Panel A. Change in nondurable expenditure
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We begin by estimating the separate response of spending to EFTs and to paper 
checks, using the analogs of ESP and I(ESP > 0) for payments received by check 
and by EFT. We start with the entire sample of households, including nonrecipients, 
because there is limited temporal variation within ESPs received by EFT.19 As shown 
in panel A of Table 4, the pattern of estimated coefficients is generally  similar across 
the two disbursement methods, across all the columns. While the point estimates are 
somewhat larger for the EFTs, they are not statistically significantly different. Next, 
panel B uses only the variation within the households that receive only on-time ESPs. 
The results are similar to those in panel A in that the estimated  coefficients are gener-
ally similar (and not statistically significantly different) across the two disbursement 
methods, though now the point estimates are generally somewhat larger for the mailed 
19 A few observations have missing values for the method-of-disbursement question and so are dropped from 
the sample.
Table 4—The Response to ESP Receipt by Method of Disbursement
Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
Panel A. Sample of all households (N = 17,281)
ESP by check 0.141 0.473 0.112 0.333
(0.077) (0.215) (0.104) (0.305)
ESP by EFT 0.144 0.583 0.169 0.661
(0.081) (0.305) (0.097) (0.332)
I(ESP by check) 2.19 3.59
(1.29) (1.61)
I(ESP by EFT ) 3.35 4.00
(1.41) (1.83)
Panel B. Sample of households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,362)
ESP by check 0.245 0.746 0.308 0.868
(0.086) (0.235) (0.133) (0.379)
ESP by EFT 0.218 0.361 0.313 0.702
(0.090) (0.317) (0.117) (0.402)
I(ESP by check) 3.99 5.78
(1.63) (2.03)
I(ESP by EFT ) 4.84 4.30
(1.81) (2.38)
Panel C. Households receiving only on-time ESPs allowing different effect of all non-ESP regressors by method 
 of disbursement (N = 10,362)
 ESP 0.211 0.529 0.262 0.784 
(0.078) (0.232) (0.149) (0.401)
 I(ESP) 3.63 5.48
(1.79) (2.23)
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the 
age of the household, a full set of month dummies, and indicators for: (i) receiving only ESPs by check; (ii) receiv-
ing only EFTs; and (iii) receiving both checks and EFTs. In panel C, there are also separate sets of all other control 
variables for households in categories (i), (ii), and (iii). Reported standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-
household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coefficients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by 
100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where 
I(ESP > 0), its interactions, and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions.
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checks. Not surprisingly, since the EFTs were disbursed over just a few weeks, using 
just timing variation leads to relatively less power for estimating the effect of EFT 
receipt, especially for the more volatile total expenditure category. Also, the smaller 
number of ESPs used to identify the effects of a mailed ESP increase standard errors 
as well. In sum, these results provide little evidence that the method of disbursement 
significantly affected the average response of spending.
We now turn to the question of whether we can identify the spending effect using 
only the randomized variation in spending within households that receive only 
on-time ESPs by check and within households that receive only on-time ESPs by 
EFT. This approach allows for the selection into each group to be nonrandom. For 
example, households receiving EFTs have somewhat higher income on average than 
households receiving paper checks and might also be different in other, hard-to-
observe ways that could potentially be correlated with the differences in timing of 
the two disbursement methods.
As already discussed, panels A and B of Table 4 provide some evidence that 
the spending effect does not differ by method of disbursement. The coefficients in 
panel B in particular are identified from variation within each group. Notably, for 
ESPs received by mail, which provide more temporal variation, the results are sta-
tistically significant and broadly similar to the average response in the final panel of 
Table 3. That is, even separately controlling for receipt of EFTs, using the random 
variation in the timing of the mailed checks still yields a significant response of 
spending to the mailed checks.
These results still impose common month dummies and common demographic 
effects (age and changes in family size) across EFT and mailed-check recipients. Also, 
to gauge the impact of the stimulus program, we want to estimate the average response 
to the stimulus payments. Accordingly, as an extension, panel C of Table 4 presents 
estimates from a pooled regression that allows for separate time dummies and demo-
graphic effects across three groups of households: (i) households that received only 
paper checks; (ii) households that received only EFTs; (iii)  households that received 
both paper checks and EFTs (only 2 percent of households). The resulting coefficient 
measures the average spending effect of the receipt of an ESP independent of its method 
of disbursement, but allowing for households to be distributed across the disbursement 
methods in a way that can potentially be correlated with their spending dynamics due 
to other factors. While slightly smaller and less statistically significant, the estimates in 
panel C remain broadly similar to those in panel C of Table 3, even though the former 
are driven only by the randomized variation in timing within each group (primarily 
paper checks, since the EFTs have limited timing variation).
In sum, our findings remain broadly consistent across specifications that use dif-
ferent forms of variation. Of course, using different variation sometimes induces 
changes in the point estimates across specifications, especially for total expendi-
tures, but not significantly so relative to the corresponding confidence intervals.
V. The Longer-Run Response of Expenditure
To investigate the longer-run effect of the receipt of the stimulus payments, we add 
the first lag of the payment variable, ES P t , as an additional regressor in equation (1). 
Under the maintained assumption that the differences in timing of ESP receipt are 
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exogenous, the coefficient on the lag of ESP measures the (dollar or percent) change 
in spending in the three-month period following the three-month period of receipt.20 
We continue to focus on the sample of households that only receive ESPs on time 
(as in panel C of Table 3). As shown in Table 5, the presence of the lagged variable 
does not much alter our previous conclusions about the short-run impact of the pay-
ment, although the coefficients on ES P t+1 are somewhat smaller than the correspond-
ing results in panel C of Table 3. Moreover, the receipt of a payment causes a change 
in spending one quarter later (i.e., from the three-month period of receipt to the next 
three-month period) that uniformly is negative but smaller in absolute magnitude 
than the contemporaneous change. Since the net effect of the payment on the level 
of spending in the later period is given by the sum of the coefficients on ES P t and 
ES P t+1 , this implies that, after increasing in the three-month period of payment receipt, 
spending remains high, though less high, in the subsequent three-month period.
These lagged spending effects are, however, estimated with less precision than the 
contemporaneous effects. For example, in the second-to-last column, for nondurable 
expenditures using 2SLS, nondurable expenditures rise by 25.4  percent of the payment 
in the quarter of receipt. The expenditure change in the next quarter is −9.7 percent, so 
that nondurable expenditures in the second three-month period are still higher on net 
than before payment receipt by 25.4  percent − 9.7  percent ≈ 15.6  percent of the pay-
ment (penultimate row of results). The cumulative change in nondurable expenditures 
over both three-month periods is then estimated to be 25.4  percent + 15.6  percent 
= 41.0 percent of the payment (bottom row). However, neither the 15.6 percent change 
20 To elaborate, by comparing households that differ in the random timing of receipt, these results trace out the 
on-impact and lagged effects of ESP receipt on spending, analogous to an impulse response. The lag of ESP cor-
responds to the second period in the impulse response. Note that these results are still partial equilibrium estimates, 
and they still control for aggregate effects via time dummies.
Table 5—The Longer-Run Response of Expenditures to ESP Receipt
Dollar change in Percent change in Dollar change in
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
Nondurable 
spending
All CE goods 
and services
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
ES P t+1 or I(ES P t+1 ) 0.201 0.517 3.92 4.96 0.254 0.757 (0.067) (0.211) (1.55) (1.96) (0.110) (0.360)
ESPt or I(ESPt) −0.054 −0.288 −1.23 −2.22 −0.097 −0.278(0.080) (0.214) (1.50) (1.92) (0.113) (0.330)
Implied spending effect in 0.146 0.230 NA NA 0.156 0.479
 second three-month
 period
(0.104) (0.303) (0.177) (0.568)
Implied cumulative fraction
 of rebate spent over both 0.347 0.747 NA NA 0.410 1.235
 three-month periods (0.155) (0.477) (0.273) (0.892)
Notes: All regressions also include the change in the number of adults, the change in the number of children, the 
age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample includes only households receiving only on-time 
ESPs. Standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. The coeffi-
cients in the second triplet of columns are multiplied by 100 so as to report a percent change. The final triplet of 
columns reports results from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as instruments for 
ESP. The number of observations for all regressions is 10,488.
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in the second period nor the 41.0 percent cumulative change is statistically significant. 
The second-period and cumulative changes are also insignificant for total expenditure 
using 2SLS. However, in the first pair of columns, using variation in the amount of the 
ESP increases statistical power, so that we find a statistically significant cumulative 
effect on spending for nondurable goods.21
In sum, we find only statistically weak evidence of an ongoing spending response. 
Even so, these results provide some evidence against a rapid reversal of spending, 
although we are unable to rule out longer-term reversals.
VI. Differences in Responses across Households and Goods
The leading explanation for why household spending would increase in response to a 
previously announced increase in income is the presence of liquidity constraints, which 
could make households unable or unwilling to increase spending until the receipt of 
an ESP.22 On the other hand, other theories propose that high-wealth or high-income 
households are more likely to spend their payments on receipt in part because they have 
smaller costs of not optimizing to fully smooth consumption over time.23
Table 6 begins by using three different proxy variables to identify households that 
may be disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained (all measured as of the 
households’ first CE expenditure interviews): age, income (family income before taxes), 
and liquid assets (the sum of balances in checking and saving accounts). Following 
the literature, for each variable, we split households into three groups (Low and High 
denoting membership in the top and bottom group), with the cutoffs between groups 
chosen to include about a third of the payment recipients in each group. Expanding 
equation (1), we interact the intercept and  ESP t+1 variables with Low and High for each 
of these proxy variables in turn. For brevity, we report only the 2SLS results.
While liquid assets is arguably the most directly relevant of the three proxy vari-
ables for identifying liquidity constraints, it is the least well measured and the most 
often missing in the CE data. This sample selection could affect both power and con-
sistency. Power is likely reduced due to the smaller samples. Consistency may or may 
not be affected. In whatever way the various samples in Table 6 are determined—for 
example on the basis of reported income, or the existence of reported income—under 
the assumption that the timing of ESP receipt is exogenous, the estimated  β 2 coef-
ficients are consistent measures of the average causal effects of interest—but only 
for the particular sample under consideration, not necessarily for the entire popula-
tion. The estimated  β 2 s and their interaction terms are what we are interested in when 
comparing, for instance, low-income households to high-income households: i.e., how 
the average treatment effect varies across income levels. But this is not what we are 
21 The coefficients are generally slightly smaller and the statistical significance slightly lower in the sample 
comprising all households. If one adds a second lag of the ESP regressor to equation (1), the resulting estimated 
spending caused in the third period (relative to before receipt) is again statistically insignificant. For nondurables 
the point estimates are near zero. For durables, the point estimates suggest an increase in spending from the second 
period after receipt to the third, and as a result an even larger estimated cumulative spending effect, but these esti-
mates have even greater statistical uncertainty than those reported in Table 5.
22 This constraint could reflect a hard constraint as studied in Zeldes (1989), or larger interest rates for borrowing 
than for saving (e.g., Davis, Kubler, and Willen 2006), or a cost for accessing illiquid wealth (e.g., Angeletos et al. 
2001; Kaplan and Violante 2011).
23 See, for example, Caballero (1995); Parker (1999); Matejka and Sims (2010); and Reis (2006).
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interested in in the presence of nonresponse bias. To give the reader a sense of the 
potential importance of such bias, the bottom section of Table 6 reports the means 
of key observable characteristics for each sample used across the various columns of 
results. While mean levels of spending, age, and income are broadly similar across 
the various samples, the samples can still, of course, differ in unobservable ways. One 
way of examining this is to compare the average response to the ESP (the average  β 2 ) 
for each sample, as reported at the bottom of the Table 6, to the average response in 
the overall sample. (See Table 3, and also Table 6, panel A, since age is not missing.)
Table 6 begins by testing whether the propensity to spend the ESPs differs by 
age. Because young households typically have low liquid wealth and high income 
growth, they are disproportionately likely to be liquidity constrained (e.g., Jappelli 
Table 6—The Propensity to Spend across Different Households
Interaction: Panel A. By age Panel B. By income Panel C. By liquid assets Panel D. By housing status
Dependent variable: Dollar change in Dollar change in Dollar change in Dollar change in
Non-
durable 
spending
All CE 
goods and 
services
Non-
durable 
spending
All CE 
goods and 
services
Non-
durable 
spending
All CE 
goods and 
services
Non-
durable 
spending
All CE
goods and 
services
Age Income Liquid assets Housing status
Low: ≤ 40 Low: ≤ 32,000 Low: ≤ 500 Low: own with mortgage
High: > 58 High: > 74,677 High: > 7,000 High: own without
ESP 0.345 0.952 0.215 0.568 0.275 0.851 0.213 0.431
 (0.133) (0.398) (0.124) (0.442) (0.164) (0.558) (0.153) (0.455)
ESP × Low −0.150 −0.461 0.024 0.715 −0.253 −0.844 0.043 0.543
 (group difference) (0.124) (0.399) (0.155) (0.500) (0.184) (0.527) (0.131) (0.394)
ESP × High 0.044 0.414 −0.009 0.205 −0.075 0.083 0.260 0.800
 (group difference) (0.151) (0.472) (0.139) (0.466) (0.186) (0.631) (0.169) (0.514)
Observations 10,488 10,488 8,592 8,592 5,071 5,071 10,380 10,380
Implied total spending
Low group 0.195 0.491 0.239 1.283 0.022 0.007 0.256 0.974
(0.114) (0.394) (0.180) (0.564) (0.205) (0.566) (0.112) (0.364)
High group 0.389 1.366 0.206 0.773 0.200 0.934 0.473 1.231
(0.168) (0.498) (0.133) (0.463) (0.202) (0.677 ) (0.175) (0.508)
Sample characteristics
Mean of:
 Spending 5,536 10,601 5,480 10,491 5,461 10,591 5,554 10,646
 ESP 259.6 252.8 307.3 260.8 
 I(ESP) 0.267 0.264 0.320 0.268 
 ESP | ESP > 0 970.8 958.1 960.8 972.7 
 Age 50.0 50.3 48.5 50.0 
 Income 60,020 60,020 59,180 60,288
 Observations [8,592] [8,592] [4,419] [8,494]
 Liquid assets 9,959 10,480 9,959 10,002
 Observations [5,071] [4,419] [5,071] [5,017]
 Coefficient on 0.308 0.911 0.216 0.808 0.186 0.662 0.300 0.929 
  ESP in subsample (0.112) (0.342) (0.112) (0.389) (0.153) (0.494) (0.112) (0.343)
Notes: All regressions also include separate intercepts for the High and Low groups, the change in the number of 
adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample 
includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs. All results are from 2SLS regressions where I(ESP > 0) 
and its interactions, along with the other regressors, are used as instruments for ESP and its interactions. Reported 
standard errors are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All sample splits are 
chosen to include about one-third of ESP recipients in each grouping.
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1990; Jappelli, Pischke, and Souleles 1998).24 In the first pair of columns in the 
table, Low refers to young households (40 years old or younger) and High refers 
to older households (older than 58), and the coefficients on the interaction terms 
with these variables represent differences relative to the households in the baseline, 
middle-age group. As reported, the point estimates for the interaction terms sug-
gest that young households spent relatively less of the payment on receipt, and old 
households spent relatively more. However these differences, while economically 
large, are not statistically significant. Nonetheless, in absolute terms the spending 
by old households (see “Implied total spending” for the interacted groups) and by 
middle-age households (coefficient on ESP) are both statistically and economically 
significant, for both nondurable and total expenditure.
Panel B in Table 6 tests for differences in spending across income groups. The 
point estimates suggest that low-income households spent a much larger fraction 
of their payment upon receipt on total expenditures relative to the typical (baseline 
middle-income) household. However, while suggestive of a possible role for liquid-
ity constraints, the difference between this result and that for the baseline group, 
although economically large at over 70 percent of the ESP, is not statistically signifi-
cant. Nonetheless, in absolute terms for total expenditures, only the response for the 
low-income households is statistically significant. The response is also economically 
significant, averaging 128 percent of the payment.25 Note that despite losing about a 
quarter of the sample due to missing income data, the average sample characteristics at 
the bottom of panel B are similar to those for panel A (which includes the entire sam-
ple, since age is not missing). Moreover, the estimated  β 2 s for the sample of income 
reporters are also relatively close to that for the entire sample. These results do not pro-
vide much reason to think that nonresponse bias is a problem in the income sample.
Panel C in Table 6 tests for differences by liquid asset holdings. While the point 
estimates suggest little spending by low-asset households, the associated confidence 
intervals are quite large, and none of the spending differences or even levels through-
out the panel are statistically significant. The loss of precision when using the asset 
variable might reflect the smaller sample sizes due to missing asset values and mea-
surement error in the available asset values. Roughly half of the data on liquid assets 
are missing. As noted in the final row in the table, in the resulting sample the average 
(uninteracted) estimated  β 2 s are economically significant, but roughly a third lower 
in magnitude than for the entire sample of on-time recipients and also statistically 
insignificant. This difference is consistent with nonresponse bias in this subsample 
(i.e., the availability of the asset data is correlated with the treatment effect).
Relative to these results, JPS found stronger spending effects in 2001 associated 
with these proxies for liquidity constraints (in particular low assets). The differences 
with 2008 could reflect statistical uncertainty in the estimates or issues of data quality 
and the subsamples studied. There may also have been differences in the  distribution 
24 There is also evidence that older households increase their spending on receiving their (predictable) pension 
checks (Wilcox 1989; Stephens 2003). Outside the null LCPIH hypothesis of β2 = 0, older households might also 
spend relatively more because they have shorter time horizons on average.
25 It is not inconsistent for the average spending response to be larger in magnitude than the average payment, 
even putting aside the confidence intervals for the former, if enough households buy large durables like autos in 
response to receiving a payment, as found and discussed below.
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of credit constraints across households between the 2001 and 2008 recessions and 
differences in expectations about the length and severity of the recessions.26
Another key characteristic of the recent recession was the large decline in hous-
ing wealth and the reduced ability to borrow against home equity. To examine the 
 potential implications for the response to the ESPs, we also estimate the differential 
spending responses across households that rented (23 percent of the sample), owned 
with a mortgage (50 percent), and owned without a mortgage (27 percent). The point 
estimates reported in panel D of Table 6 suggest that both groups of homeowners 
spent more of their ESPs than renters, but the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant. Combining all homeowners into one group, the estimated spending responses 
for total expenditures are 1.051 (0.351) for homeowners and 0.434 (0.454) for renters, 
and these estimates are statistically significantly different at the 10 percent level.27
Turning to differences across types of expenditures, each column in panels A, 
B, and C in Table 7 reports the estimated change in spending for each subcategory 
of expenditures within the broad measure of nondurable expenditures (a complete 
decomposition). The table also reports, for each subcategory, its implied share of 
the total increase in nondurable spending caused by the ESP, and, for benchmarking, 
the average share of each subcategory in nondurable expenditures (over the entire 
sample). Of course, comparisons of different subsets of nondurable expenditure 
must be interpreted cautiously because of potential nonseparabilities across goods, 
and in general the greater variability in dependent variables renders the results at 
this level of disaggregation statistically weak. 28 Nonetheless, the point estimates 
suggest a disproportionately large response in alcohol, personal care (and miscel-
laneous items), tobacco, and apparel.
Panel D of Table 7 provides the decomposition of the response of the durable 
goods and services part of total expenditures (i.e., total expenditures not in the 
nondurable expenditures category). The bulk of the spending response in durables 
(87 percent) comes in transportation, spending on which increases by 53 percent 
of the payments on average, a statistically and economically significant amount. 
This response is also large relative to the average share of transportation in durable 
expenditures (27 percent). Panel E in turn decomposes the response of the different 
subcategories of transportation. According to the point estimates, the transportation 
response is largely driven by purchases of vehicles, primarily new vehicles. The 
receipt of a stimulus payment increased the probability of purchasing a vehicle by 
enough to imply a large average response of total expenditures to the payments. 
These results imply that auto purchases, although weakening during the recession, 
would have been even weaker in the absence of the payments.
26 For example, if constrained households in 2008 expected the recession to last longer than usual, that would 
reduce the magnitude of their current response to the payment, ceteris paribus.
27 The results for homeowners do not simply reflect the preceding results for older households, e.g., if one 
drops from the sample the households older than 65, the resulting coefficients for nondurable expenditure remain 
very similar to those reported in the table, for all three groups of households in panel D. The coefficients for total 
expenditure remain very similar for renters and homeowners with mortgages. While the coefficient for total expen-
diture loses significance for homeowners without mortgages, presumably in part due to the reduced sample of such 
homeowners, it remains large in magnitude; and as in the table, the coefficient for nondurable expenditure remains 
significant and is largest for homeowners without mortgages, compared to the other two groups.
28 Our previous results, by summing the subcategories into broader aggregates of nondurable expenditures, aver-
aged out much of this unrelated variability (such as, for example, whether a trip to the supermarket happened to fall 
just inside or outside the expenditure reference period).
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Keeping in mind the degree of statistical significance, our finding of a large spend-
ing response on new cars is suggestive of an important role for liquidity constraints. 
The ESPs may have provided otherwise unavailable down payments for debt-
financed purchases of cars. In this case, whether this spending on autos would be 
reversed in the short term would depend on whether the ESPs caused all  households 
to on average buy a car a few months sooner, leading to no subsequent short-term 
decline in aggregate demand, or whether those whose ESPs did not cause them 
to purchase a car immediately instead spent their ESPs on other items and were 
constrained and unable to purchase cars a few months later, leading to a reversal in 
demand.
In contrast, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that models of inat-
tention seem unlikely to explain the results for autos. Under inattention, broadly 
 speaking, some households can be surprised by their receipt of an ESP. To illustrate 
Table 7—The Propensity to Spend on Subcategories of Expenditures
Panel A. Food
Panel B. Additional categories  
in strictly nondurables
Dependent variable: 
Food at
home
Food
away
from home
Alcoholic 
beverages
Utilities,  
household 
operations
Personal
care
and misc.
Gas, motor 
fuel, public 
transportation
Tobacco 
products
Coefficient on ESP 0.050 0.025 0.011 0.059 0.083 0.027 0.007
Standard error (0.032) (0.033) (0.007) (0.027) (0.049) (0.039) (0.009)
Implied share of increase 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.27 0.09 0.02
 in nondurable
 spending
Share of avg. spending on 0.23 0.11 0.01 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.01
 subcategory
Panel C. Additional categories 
in nondurables Panel D. Additional categories in total CE spending
Dollar change in
 spending on: Apparel Health Reading
  Housing  
(incl. furnishings) Entertainment Education Transportation
Coefficient on ESP 0.022 0.025 −0.001 0.099 0.077 −0.100 0.527
Standard error (0.021) (0.048) (0.003) (0.092) (0.099) (0.042) (0.269)
Implied share of increase in:
 Nondurable spending 0.07 0.08 0.00
 Durable spending 0.16 0.13 −0.17 0.87
Avg. spending on subcategory:
 Share of nondurable 0.06 0.15 0.01
 Share of durable 0.56 0.13 0.04 0.27
Panel E. Subcategories of transportation
Dollar change in 
 spending on:
New
vehicle 
purchases
Used 
vehicle 
purchases
Other 
vehicle 
purchases
  Maintenance
and
repairs
Other, 
insurance fees, 
etc.
Coefficient on ESP 0.357 0.123 0.011 0.009 0.027
Standard error (0.204) (0.149) (0.054) (0.028) (0.024)
Implied share of increase in durable spending
0.59 0.20 0.02 0.01 0.04
Share of average durable spending
0.07 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.09
Notes: The first rows of each panel report results from a regression that also includes the change in the number of 
adults, the change in the number of children, the age of the household, and a full set of month dummies. The sample 
includes only households receiving only on-time ESPs (N = 10,488 for all regressions). Reported standard errors 
are adjusted for arbitrary within-household correlations and heteroskedasticity. All results are from 2SLS regres-
sions where I(ESP) and the other regressors are used as instruments for ESP.
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the  implications for spending, if such households spend about 10 percent of their 
expenditures on cars on average (over time and across households), then an increase 
in lifetime resources from an ESP would lead to an increase in lifetime consumption 
of car services of about 10 percent of the ESP. If cars were infinitely lived, then this 
would suggest an average increase in spending on cars of 10 percent of the ESP, a 
number economically (though not statistically) much lower than we find.29
VII. Conclusion
We find that on average households spent about 12 to 30 percent of their stimu-
lus payments, depending on the specification, on (CE-defined) nondurable expen-
ditures during the three-month period in which the payments were received. This 
response is larger than implied by the LCPIH or Ricardian equivalence. We also find 
a significant effect on the purchase of durable goods, primarily the purchase of new 
vehicles, bringing the average response of total consumption expenditures to about 
50 to 90 percent of the payments in the quarter of receipt. These results are statisti-
cally and economically significant. They remain broadly consistent and significant 
across specifications using different forms of variation. Indeed, the point estimates 
are at the high end of these ranges in specifications that focus most directly on the 
randomized timing of ESP receipt.
For nondurable expenditures, the estimated spending response to the 2008 ESPs 
is generally only slightly smaller in magnitude (and not significantly different) than 
the response to the 2001 tax rebates. This difference might partly reflect the more 
transitory nature of the 2008 tax cut. However, the composition of spending is dif-
ferent than in 2001, so that the estimated spending effect on total expenditures is 
larger than that in 2001 due to a larger role for durables in 2008. This difference 
might partly reflect the larger size of the payments in 2008, or differences in macro-
economic situation. (For example, the doubling in the price of oil might have made 
more households willing to use the rebate as a down payment to purchase a more 
fuel-efficient new car). That said, the overall pattern of results is generally similar 
in 2001 and 2008.
As in 2001, we also find some evidence of an ongoing though smaller response 
in the subsequent three-month period after ESP receipt, but this response cannot 
be estimated with precision. Regarding the implementation of the new method of 
delivering tax cuts, the estimated responses do not significantly differ across paper 
checks and electronic transfers.
Across households, according to the point estimates the spending responses are larg-
est for older and low-income households, groups which have substantial and statisti-
cally significant responses. By assets, the estimated spending response is largest for 
high-asset households, but this response is not statistically significantly different from 
zero, and more generally all of the asset results suffer from a lack of statistical power. 
Also, the estimated spending response is larger for homeowners than for renters.
Our estimates suggest a significant macroeconomic effect of the 2008 ESPs on 
consumer demand, although as noted in the introduction, we do not measure either 
29 Since cars are finite lived, the increase in spending should be even less than 10 percent. Incorporating adjust-
ment costs would further reduce the short-term response.
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the general equilibrium impact on spending nor any spending changes not corre-
lated with the timing of the ESP receipt (such as anticipatory effects). Using the 
point estimates for total expenditures from Tables 2 and 3 (that ignore statistically 
insignificant lagged spending effects), the receipt of the ESPs caused a partial- 
equilibrium increase in demand of about 1.3 to 2.3 percent of PCE in 2008:II and 
0.6 to 1.0 percent in 2008:III (at annual rates). Of course the ultimate effect of this 
program on actual PCE depends on additional factors such as anticipatory effects, 
price and interest rate adjustment, and multiplier effects.
Appendix: The 2008 ESP Survey Instrument
The following questions were asked in all CE interviews in June 2008–March 2009:
[Earlier this year/Last year] the Federal government approved an economic stim-
ulus package. [Many households will receive a one-time economic stimulus pay-
ment, either by check or direct deposit/Previously you or your CU [[consumer unit]] 
reported receiving one or more economic stimulus payments.] This is also called a 
tax rebate and is different from a refund on your annual income taxes.
Since the first of the reference month, have you or any members of your CU received 
a/an additional
10. Tax rebate? [Economic Stimulus Payment]
99. None/No more entries
Who was the rebate for? [enter text] _____________
* Collect each rebate separately and include the name(s) of the recipient(s).
In what month did you receive the rebate? [enter text] _____________
What was the total amount of the rebate? [enter value] _____________
* Probe if the amount is not an expected increment such as $300, $600, $900, 
$1,200, etc
Was the rebate received by–?
1. check?
2. direct deposit?
Did you or any members of your CU receive any other tax rebate [economic  stimulus 
payment]?
1. Yes
2. No
If yes, return to “Who was the tax rebate for?”
parker et al.: consumer spending and stimulus payments 2552VOL. 103 NO. 6
REFERENCES
Aaronson, Daniel, Sumit Agarwal, and Eric French. 2012. “The Spending and Debt Response to Mini-
mum Wage Hikes.” American Economic Review 102 (7): 3111–39.
Adams, William, Liran Einav, and Jonathan Levin. 2009. “Liquidity Constraints and Imperfect Infor-
mation in Subprime Lending.” American Economic Review 99 (1): 49–84.
Agarwal, Sumit, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2007. “The Reaction of Consumer Spending 
and Debt to Tax Rebates—Evidence from Consumer Credit Data.” Journal of Political Economy 
115 (6): 986–1019.
Angeletos, George-Marios, David Laibson, Andrea Repetto, Jeremy Tobacman, and Stephen Wein-
berg. 2001. “The Hyperbolic Buffer Stock Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical Evalua-
tion.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 15 (3): 47–68.
Auerbach, Alan J., and William G. Gale. 2010. “Activist Fiscal Policy to Stabilize Economic 
Activity.” In Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy: A Symposium Sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 327–74. Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City.
Barrow, Lisa, and Leslie McGranahan. 2000. “The Effects of the Earned Income Credit on the Season-
ality of Household Expenditures.” National Tax Journal 53 (4): 1211–43.
Bertrand, Marianne, and Adair Morse. 2009. “What Do High-Interest Borrowers Do with Their Tax 
Rebate?” American Economic Review 99 (2): 418–23.
Broda, Christian, and Jonathan Parker. 2008. “The Impact of the 2008 Tax Rebates on Consumer 
Spending: Preliminary Evidence.” Unpublished.
Browning, Martin, and Annamaria Lusardi. 1996. “Household Saving: Micro Theories and Macro 
Facts.” Journal of Economic Literature 34 (4): 1797–855.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor. 2009. “Consumer Expenditure Survey Results 
on the 2008 Economic Stimulus Payments (Tax Rebates).” http://www.bls.gov/cex/taxrebate.htm (accessed October 15, 2009).
Caballero, Ricardo J. 1995. “Near-Rationality, Heterogeneity, and Aggregate Consumption.” Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking 27 (1): 29–48.
Chamberlain, Gary. 1984. “Panel Data.” In Handbook of Econometrics. Vol. 2, edited by Zvi Griliches 
and Michael D. Intriligator, 1247–1318. Amsterdam: Elsevier, North-Holland.
Coronado, Julia Lynn, Joseph P. Lupton, and Louise M. Sheiner. 2006. “The Household Spending 
Response to the 2003 Tax Cut: Evidence from Survey Data.” Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (US), Finance and Economics Discussion Series: 2005–32.
Davis, Steven J., Felix Kubler, and Paul Willen. 2006. “Borrowing Costs and the Demand for Equity 
over the Life Cycle.” Review of Economics and Statistics 88 (2): 348–62.
Deaton, Angus. 1992. Understanding Consumption. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jappelli, Tullio. 1990. “Who Is Credit Constrained in the US Economy?” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105 (1): 219–34.
Jappelli, Tullio, Jörn-Steffen Pischke, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 1998. “Testing for Liquidity Con-
straints in Euler Equations with Complementary Data Sources.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
80 (2): 251–62.
Jappelli, Tullio, and Luigi Pistaferri. 2010. “The Consumption Response to Income Changes.” Annual 
Review of Economics 2 (1): 479–506.
Johnson, David S., Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2006. “Household Expenditure and 
the Income Tax Rebates of 2001.” American Economic Review 96 (5): 1589–610.
Johnson, David S., Jonathan A. Parker, and Nicholas S. Souleles. 2009. “The Response of Consumer 
Spending to Rebates During an Expansion: Evidence from the 2003 Child Tax Credit.” Unpublished.
Kaplan, Greg, and Giovanni L. Violante. 2011. “A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal 
Stimulus Payments.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 17338.
Leininger, Lindsey, Helen Levy, and Diane Schanzenbach. 2010. “Consequences of SCHIP Expan-
sions for Household Well-Being.” Forum for Health Economics and Policy 13 (1): 1–32.
Lusardi, Annamaria. 1996. “Permanent Income, Current Income, and Consumption: Evidence from 
Two Panel Datasets.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 14 (1): 81–90.
Matejka, Filip, and Christopher A. Sims. 2010. “Discrete Actions in Information-Constrained Track-
ing Problems.” Unpublished.
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 2012. “The Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from the 2009 Cash for 
Clunkers Program.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (3): 1107–42.
Misra, Kanishka, and Paolo Surico. 2011. “Heterogeneous Responses and Aggregate Impact of the 
2001 Income Tax Rebates.” Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper 8306.
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW2553 october 2013
Parker, Jonathan A. 1999. “The Reaction of Household Consumption to Predictable Changes in Social 
Security Taxes.” American Economic Review 89 (4): 959–73.
Parker, Jonathan A., Nicholas S. Souleles, David S. Johnson, and Robert McClelland. 2011. “Con-
sumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008.” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 16684.
Parker, Jonathan A., Nicholas S. Souleles, David S. Johnson, and Robert McClelland. 2013. “Con-
sumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus Payments of 2008: Dataset.” American Economic 
Review. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.6.2530.
Reis, Ricardo. 2006. “Inattentive Consumers.” Journal of Monetary Economics 53 (8): 1761–800.
Sahm, Claudia R., Matthew D. Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod. 2010. “Household Response to the 2008 
Tax Rebates: Survey Evidence and Aggregate Implications.” In Tax Policy and The Economy. 
Vol. 24, edited by Jeffrey R. Brown, 69–110. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shapiro, Matthew D., and Joel Slemrod. 2003a. “Consumer Response to Tax Rebates.” American Eco-
nomic Review 93 (1): 381–96.
Shapiro, Matthew D., and Joel Slemrod. 2003b. “Did the 2001 Tax Rebate Stimulate Spending? Evi-
dence from Taxpayer Surveys.” In Tax Policy and the Economy. Vol. 17, edited by James Poterba, 
83–110. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Shapiro, Matthew D., and Joel Slemrod. 2009. “Did the 2008 Tax Rebates Stimulate Spending?” 
American Economic Review 99 (2): 374–79.
Slemrod, Joel, Charles Christian, Rebecca London, and Jonathan A. Parker. 1997. “April 15 Syn-
drome.” Economic Inquiry 35 (4): 695–709.
Souleles, Nicholas S. 1999. “The Response of Household Consumption to Income Tax Refunds.” Amer-
ican Economic Review 89 (4): 947–58.
Souleles, Nicholas S. 2004. “Expectations, Heterogeneous Forecast Errors, and Consumption: Micro 
Evidence from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Surveys.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Bank-
ing 36 (1): 39–72.
Stephens, Melvin, Jr. 2003. ““3rd of tha Month”: Do Social Security Recipients Smooth Consumption 
between Checks?” American Economic Review 93 (1): 406–22.
US Department of the Treasury, Financial Management Service. 2008. “Daily Treasury Statement.” 
Various Issues. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Wilcox, David W. 1989. “Social Security Benefits, Consumption Expenditure, and the Life Cycle 
Hypothesis.” Journal of Political Economy 97 (2): 288–304.
Zeldes, Stephen P. 1989. “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation.” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 97 (2): 305–46.
This article has been cited by:
1. Mark Hoekstra, Steven L. Puller, Jeremy West. 2017. Cash for Corollas: When Stimulus Reduces
Spending. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 9:3, 1-35. [Abstract] [View PDF article]
[PDF with links]
2. Tarek A. Hassan, Thomas M. Mertens. 2017. The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment. American
Economic Review 107:4, 1059-1103. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
3. Grant Graziani, Wilbert van der Klaauw, Basit Zafar. 2016. Workers' Spending Response to the 2011
Payroll Tax Cuts. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 8:4, 124-159. [Abstract] [View PDF
article] [PDF with links]
4. Christina D. Romer, David H. Romer. 2016. Transfer Payments and the Macroeconomy: The Effects
of Social Security Benefit Increases, 1952–1991. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 8:4,
1-42. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
5. Alisdair McKay, Emi Nakamura, Jón Steinsson. 2016. The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited.
American Economic Review 106:10, 3133-3158. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
6. Joshua K. Hausman. 2016. Fiscal Policy and Economic Recovery: The Case of the 1936 Veterans'
Bonus. American Economic Review 106:4, 1100-1143. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
7. Naomi E. Feldman, Peter Katuš čÁk, Laura Kawano. 2016. Taxpayer Confusion: Evidence from the
Child Tax Credit. American Economic Review 106:3, 807-835. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF
with links]
8. Anton Korinek, Alp Simsek. 2016. Liquidity Trap and Excessive Leverage. American Economic Review
106:3, 699-738. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
9. Sumit Agarwal, Wenlan Qian. 2014. Consumption and Debt Response to Unanticipated Income
Shocks: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Singapore. American Economic Review 104:12,
4205-4230. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
10. Kanishka Misra, Paolo Surico. 2014. Consumption, Income Changes, and Heterogeneity: Evidence
from Two Fiscal Stimulus Programs. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6:4, 84-106.
[Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
11. Tullio Jappelli, Luigi Pistaferri. 2014. Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 6:4, 107-136. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
12. Greg Kaplan, Giovanni L. Violante. 2014. A Tale of Two Stimulus Payments: 2001 versus 2008.
American Economic Review 104:5, 116-121. [Abstract] [View PDF article] [PDF with links]
